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Abstract
This paper abridges a Canadian study that examined bird-related safety risks to aircraft climbing to
10,000 feet MSL (mean sea level) at speeds in excess of 250 kias (knots indicated airspeed). The
study employed a risk-based framework to examine ornithological information, bird strike data,
aircraft-certification standards, aircraft climb performance and aircraft flight profiles.
Foremost among its findings, the study determined that populations of high-risk bird species are
increasing, that many of these species flock at the altitudes in question, and that aircraft exposure to
risk will increase in part because of projected increases in aircraft movements.
Examining the appropriateness of current and proposed mitigation, the study determined that
current airframe and engine certification standards do not reduce risks associated with strikes by
high-risk bird species. The study also found that any potential operating-cost savings that might be
achieved through increased flight speeds would be more than offset by losses incurred through bird
strikes.
The study predicted that higher flight speeds would increase the total number of bird strike events
involving high-risk species, the number of occurrences involving major damage, and the potential
for catastrophic losses.
Accordingly, the study concluded that aircraft should remain restricted to speeds of 250 knots or
slower below 10,000 feet MSL.
Introduction
Background: Nearly half of the world’s aircraft activity occurs in the United States, where aircraft
speeds below 10,000 feet MSL are governed by FAR 91.117(a). The regulation states: “Unless
otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet
MSL at an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288 mph).” The rule evolved as a means to
augment see-and-avoid VFR practices following several mid-air collisions in the early 1960s.
Although difficult to confirm, the rule also appears to provide the baseline for a number of speedrelated, bird strike-tolerance test conditions related to engine and airframe design and certification.
For the most part, aircraft operating in Canada conform to FAA certification rules; however,
Canada is not currently in harmony with FAR 91.117(a) respecting aircraft speed on departures
from Canadian airports.
Nonetheless, populations of large flocking-bird species—which tend to migrate at relatively high
altitudes—are increasing in Canada, as are damaging bird strike events at higher altitudes. In
response, Transport Canada (TC) presented a Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-022 to
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CAR 602.32 on February 26, 2002. The NPA proposed to eliminate the Canadian ATC practice of
allowing aircraft departing from Canadian airports to exceed 250 kias below 10,000 feet MSL.
To provide additional data in support of the amendment, TC contracted a risk analysis of the
practice. The resulting study, Risk Analysis of High Speed Aircraft Departures Below 10,000 Feet
(ref. 1), was presented to the TC Canadian Aviation Regulatory Committee. The committee
concluded that there was a requirement to manage risks associated with collisions between large
flocking birds and aircraft operating at the altitudes in question, and decided to enact NPA 2002022.
In the past, the development of air regulations has been reactive; most aviation-industry rules have
been drafted in response to accidents. NPA 2002-022, however, marked a turning point for TC. The
amendment was among the department’s first attempts to apply data-driven risk-management
procedures to develop air-safety regulations proactively. The study was also the world’s first
holistic, system-safety examination of risks associated with high-speed departures. As such, this
work may influence other nations to consider enacting similar—or revising existing—regulations.
Objective and Method: The TC study examined safety risks related to high-speed departures at
altitudes below 10,000 feet. The analysis was conducted using accepted industry techniques—by
identifying hazards and determining related-risk probability and severity with respect to current
and proposed mitigation.
For the purposes of TC’s analysis, the specific hazards were birds. Safety risks associated with this
hazard range from minor aircraft damage to an aircraft impact with the ground.
Strike probability is proportional to exposure to a hazard, and therefore is determined by the
presence of species types (e.g., population numbers), as well as the characteristics of those species.
Five gradient classes are employed to predict probability, of which Class One predicts frequent
likelihood of a bird strike and Class Five predicts a rare probability.
Strike severity indicates the potential consequences of bird strike events, and includes injury or loss
of human life as well as economic losses associated with aircraft damage. Category-A events
indicate catastrophic loss, measured as either the complete loss of an aircraft or the loss of more
than one human life as a consequence of a bird strike event. Category-B events indicate major
damage, measured as either significant damage to airframes, failure of one or more engines, failure
of one or more aircraft systems, serious injury to one or more aircraft occupants, or the loss of life
of no more than one aircraft occupant. Finally, Category-C events indicate minor damage to
airframes, engines or aircraft systems.
The degree of severity is influenced by a variety of factors, including bird mass, the number of
birds involved in a strike, aircraft speed, and the point of impact on an aircraft.
Probability and severity of damaging bird strikes are influenced by the nature of mitigation. For
example, the use of landing lights reduces the probability of strikes by making aircraft more
conspicuous to birds; windshield heaters diminish severity of bird impacts by making these
surfaces more pliable.
Information sources include the bird and wildlife strike databases of Transport Canada, the FAA
and ICAO, as well as aircraft and engine certification standards published in Part V of the
Canadian Air Regulations.
For more information on bird strikes visit
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Scope: The proposed amendment addresses only those aspects of CAR 602.32 that restrict
departures between 3,000 feet AGL (above ground level) and 10,000 feet MSL at maximum speeds
of 250 knots. Thus, the analysis focused on aircraft types and operations that have normal operating
envelopes above 10,000 feet and at speeds greater than 250 knots.
Limitations: Data related to the risk analysis was limited in a number of ways. With regard to bird
strike data, experts suggest that only 20 to 30 percent of bird strike events are actually reported. As
a result, the probability of bird strike events is likely higher than the data suggest. Furthermore,
data elements of bird strike occurrences are inconsistently reported, leading to incomplete records.
Since no single repository of bird species data exists, estimates were produced from data collated
from a variety of sources.
As tracking mechanisms to attribute aircraft repair and aircraft time out of service costs to
particular bird strike events are either poor or non-existent, it was difficult to determine precise
costs of aircraft damage caused by bird strike events.
With respect to industry operational data—much of which is protected as proprietary business
information—airlines neither consistently nor accurately report flying hours, nor do they report
flying hours that aircraft spend between the altitudes of 3,000 and 10,000 feet. Such limitations
impeded an accurate determination of potential operational efficiencies and cost savings that might
be realized through high-speed departures.
High-risk Bird Species
The study examined in detail the bird species that pose greater risks to flight above 3,000 feet
AGL. Analysis exposed critical information concerning species population trends and bird
movements.
As greater risks are presented by medium-sized and large birds, the study paid particular attention
to bird species—namely, migratory waterfowl, gulls and raptors—with mean weights (1.5, 4 and 8
lbs.) that are near, at, and above those referenced in aircraft and engine certification standards.
A review of literature on bird populations (ref. 2 and 3) revealed that populations of North
American high-risk bird species are subject to an overall increasing trend, partly due to habitat and
species conservation measures. For example, during the 10-year period between 1990 and 1999,
the North American Canada Goose population tripled from 2 million to 6 million. The US Fish and
Wildlife Service’s waterfowl-population status report for 2000 indicates that the population of
geese in North America is growing at approximately 10 percent each year, and will nearly double
to reach some 11.7 million birds by 2005.
The study also focused on bird flocking behaviour, as the potential number of strikes in a single
bird strike occurrence—as well as potential for damage—increases with the number of birds
involved. Of the 36 North American species whose mean weight is 4 lbs. or greater, 24 (67
percent) exhibit strong flocking behaviour, 9 (25 percent) exhibit limited flocking behaviour, and 3
(8 percent) exhibit solitary behaviour.
The study included an examination of migratory activity, revealing that as many as 80 percent of
North American bird species migrate. While altitudes vary, certain radar data indicate that the
majority of migratory birds fly between 5,000 and 7,000 feet AGL.
For more information on bird strikes visit
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Bird Strike Data Analysis
The study’s examination of various bird and wildlife strike databases revealed a number of
compelling findings. For example, the top three bird species struck between altitudes of 3,000 and
10,000 feet were also among the largest: waterfowl (50.6 percent), gulls (19.7 percent) and raptors
(9.7 percent). Of note, 50 percent of the strikes that involve waterfowl also account for 90 percent
of all damage costs.
The data also show that the likelihood of striking waterfowl increases with altitude. As waterfowl
are also flocking species, the probability of multiple-strike events may also increase. In fact, 30
percent of strikes in which birds were heavier than 4 lbs. involved more than one bird; 39 percent
of multiple-bird strikes involved birds heavier than 8 lbs.
As the most severe consequences would likely occur if an event involved multiple strikes of large
flocking birds ingested by aircraft engines, it follows that aircraft with at least two engines—and
preferably more—are more likely to survive an event. However, current aircraft design trends
appear relatively uninfluenced by the threat of multiple-strike events. In 1969, 75 percent of the
commercial airline fleet was composed of aircraft with more than two engines each. This number
will have decreased to 10 percent by 2008.
Findings related to strike distribution by altitude (figure 1) were of particular interest. Of
significance is the inverse relationship between numbers of reported strikes and actual strike
damage as altitude increases. Although the number of reported strikes decreases as altitudes
become greater, damage resulting from strikes is increasingly likely above 7,000 feet. This trend is
due to the species struck at these altitudes (noted above), as well as the relative increase in true air
speed at higher altitudes.
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Figure 1 – Bird strikes versus altitude
Not surprisingly, seasonal data indicate that, while strikes occurred year round, they peaked during
spring and fall migratory periods. On the other hand, night and day strikes were rather evenly
distributed—51.1 percent to 48.8, respectively. This suggests that pilots are no more able to detect
and avoid birds during daylight conditions than during periods of darkness.
The study’s analysis of aircraft damage costs faced a considerable challenge. Estimates suggest that
only 20 percent of reports involving damaging strikes actually include any damage costs. In light of
limited reporting—as well as a lack of indirect cost data—any estimates of damage cost per strike
event and annual strike costs are significantly less than actual values.
Using available data, the study calculated the average per-strike damage cost to be US$71,413. By
extrapolation, a highly conservative average damage-cost projection of strikes between 3,000 and
10,000 feet is US$2.05 million annually in North America; the same average cost in Canada is an
equally conservative CDN$434,000.
While indirect cost estimates are even less reliable, current information (ref. 4) enabled basic
calculations. Damage from bird strikes leads, at best, to flight delays and, at worst, to flight
cancellations. Industry information indicates that a single delay or cancellation leads to four
secondary delays or cancellations. Based on estimated costs for flight delays and cancellations, the
study determined North American indirect bird strike damage costs to be as high as
US$16.2/CDN$24.7 million per year—CDN$2.7 million of this total in Canada.
It is important to note that these indirect figures do not consider any costs associated with loss of
passenger goodwill resulting from delays and cancellations, or legal fees and damage settlements
resulting from associated civil litigation.
Aircraft and Engine Certification Standards
The study found that aircraft and engine certification standards, like many in the aviation industry,
do not mirror conditions encountered during actual operations. With regard to bird-impact forces,
certification standards assume the compromise of only one system or component per event. In other
words, standards do not require manufacturers to demonstrate safe flight after bird strike events
that damage multiple aircraft components—such as a strike event that damages the airframe and
one or more engines.
Certification standards have numerous other limitations. Standards are designed principally to
address the critical take-off phase of flight. Tests are not conducted to address engine ingestion of
birds at speeds higher than those referenced in the standards, nor are tests conducted with bird
species having mean weights that exceed the standards. Furthermore, the standards require no
examination of uncontained engine failures that lead to damage to other aircraft systems, such as
hydraulics and flight controls. Consequently, the standards take no account of numerous
circumstances that are predictable in normal operating conditions. This paucity of data hinders risk
analysis.
The study noted that FAR 33 standards were revised in September 2000 to address increased bird
weights; however, no plan exists to make retroactive any regulatory amendments. Only newly
developed engines will be required to meet enhanced standards.
For more information on bird strikes visit
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Airframe-certification standards focus on four areas: air-speed indicating systems, airframes,
windshields and empennage. No plans have been developed in the United States or Canada to
extend these standards, which are based solely on the likelihood of single bird impacts.
The study went on to examine in detail the complexities of both air speed and bird-impact force,
calculated by determining change in a bird’s kinetic energy:
A mid-sized Canada Goose (10 lbs.) that strikes an aircraft at 250 kias at 9,000 feet MSL generates
an impact force of 72,617 lbs. An impact at the same altitude with a goose of the same weight at
300 knots—a speed increase of only 20 percent—results in a 44 percent increase in impact force, or
104,500 lbs.
The study found that, even at 250 kias, birds of 8 lbs. and greater exceed FAR certification impact
standards between altitudes of approximately 8,000 and 10,000 feet. When IAS is increased to 300
knots, the results change dramatically. Even 4-lb. birds exceed strike-impact standards above
approximately 4,300 feet MSL; 8 lb. birds exceed impact standards at all elevations.
Stakeholder Liability
The issue of liability for injury, death and damage resulting from bird strikes is complex and varies
according to the circumstances of each event. The study undertook a brief examination of potentialstakeholder liability to provide context for the safety-risk evaluation process.
The principal aim with respect to liability is to establish proof of negligent conduct by one or more
stakeholders. In the event of litigation, stakeholder actions would be judged by determining
whether they had demonstrated due diligence in exercising appropriate duties of care and warning
with respect to bird strike hazards. Particular attention would focus on the probability of bird
strikes resulting from Transport Canada regulations, and the adequacy of aircraft-certification
standards to mitigate risks. An air operator’s policy would be judged on whether it was reasonable
and proactive in mitigating bird strike risk during the departure phase of flight. As the airnavigation service provider, NAV CANADA would be judged on the adequacy of its
communication of high-speed flight hazards below 10,000 feet, and on the tools provided to
controllers to assess related risks. An aircraft manufacturer would be scrutinized to determine
whether it clearly communicated information to air operators and flight crews regarding bird strike
impact certification speeds for each aircraft and model. Finally, pilots-in-command would be
judged on their assessment of bird strike risk for a flight, and their application of company policy
and aircraft-operating techniques to minimize related risks.
The TC study, however, found that the current level of stakeholder knowledge is poor and
inconsistent with respect to safety-risks associated with high-speed flight below 10,000 feet MSL.
As there are numerous examples of successful litigious actions in which bird strike damage cases
have resulted in multi-million dollar judgments, the study observed that all stakeholders would be
well advised to embark on education and awareness programs to ensure that appropriate standards
of care are met.
Potential Operating Efficiencies
Although risk analysis seeks to mitigate occurrence probability or severity, mitigation must be
assessed in the context of associated economic costs. The study determined that theoretical
For more information on bird strikes visit
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efficiencies achievable by improving a single aviation-system component are almost always
reduced and sometimes nullified by other constraints experienced during normal operating
conditions. Net operating costs, in fact, balance fuel efficiency and aircraft-operating time—the
most fuel-efficient flight is not necessarily the most cost-efficient flight, nor is the most timeefficient flight necessarily the most cost efficient. For example, an aircraft operating at 325 knots,
but with a manufacturer’s economical speed of 285 knots, will incur a fuel-burn penalty that may
offset any efficiency accrued through increased operating speed.
The study investigated numerous factors related to potential operating efficiencies, including
aircraft performance during climb phase, efficiencies in high-speed climbs, speed limitations,
aviation-system constraints to high-speed flight, and altitude and temperature effects on
performance.
Relationships differ between aircraft speed and exposure, speed and probability, and speed and
severity. Exposure increases linearly with speed; a 20 percent increase in speed leads to a 20
percent increase in exposure. Probability is an inverse function of rate of climb; a 20 percent
increase in rate of climb reduces probability by 20 percent. Severity, however, increases as the
square of speed, so that a 20 percent increase in speed increases impact forces by 44 percent (1.22 =
1.44).
A review of performance data shows that rate of climb in constant indicated-airspeed climbs
changes by only +/- 3 to 5 percent as indicated airspeeds increase in the altitude range considered
in the study, and therefore has no significant effect on bird strike probability. In accelerating speed
climbs, however, rate of climb is reduced approximately 50 percent, thereby doubling the
probability of occurrence while the aircraft is accelerating. Therefore, during normal climb and
acceleration maneuvers to speeds above 250 knots, exposure, probability and severity of bird strike
risk are higher than those in a constant 250-knot climb. Exposure and probability will increase
proportionately, and severity will increase as a square function.
As it is proprietary information of manufacturers and airlines, aircraft performance data was, for
the most part, unavailable. However, the aviation industry reports average aircraft-operating costs
to be $60 per minute. According to industry calculations (ref. 5), the greatest savings in operating
expenses are $19 for a 300-knot climb and $23 for a 330-knot climb. When compounded over a
large number of flights, these savings can be considerable. For an airline that operates 750 flights
per day, a savings of $630,000 could be achieved every year.
These figures, however, are theoretical and do not take into account real-world operational
constraints experienced during most flights. For example, more than 400,000 movements take
place each year at Toronto’s Lester B. Pearson International Airport. The facility often operates at
maximum capacity, requiring ground-delay programs, airborne holding of aircraft, and flow control
to manage traffic movement. Under these conditions, high-speed flight below 10,000 feet MSL will
not increase air-navigation service capacity, reducing the ability to achieve the theoretically
calculated savings.
Safety-risk Analysis
Exposure and probability: The study noted that the principal variables affecting exposure to risk,
and therefore occurrence probability, are aircraft-traffic movements, bird-species population trends,
flight distance, and time spent in bird-rich altitudes. In the absence of mitigation, an increase in one
or all risk factors can be expected to result in a higher frequency of bird strike events.
For more information on bird strikes visit
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Canadian air traffic continues to increase, influenced only occasionally by such short-term
anomalies as the temporary downswing experienced after the events of September 11, 2001.
Growing demands for air travel will drive the search for increased airspace capacity. Consequently,
the number of aircraft operating through altitudes of 3,000 to 10,000 feet is expected to increase.
Meanwhile, populations of high-risk bird species are also increasing. The result will likely be a
corresponding increase in the probability of bird strike events between 3,000 and 10,000 feet.
Severity: The study observed that strike severity fluctuates with changes both to populations of
large flocking species and to aircraft operating speeds. Increases in flocking species will lead not
just to increased occurrence probability, as demonstrated earlier, but also to increases in
occurrences that result in more severe Category-A and B damages.
Of particular concern is the previously reported increase in populations of large flocking waterfowl
species, particularly Canada Geese. In a UK study (ref. 2), modeling of aircraft encounters with
Canada Geese predicted that 18 percent of occurrences would involve impact to both aircraft
engines.
With respect to changes in aircraft operating speeds, the study demonstrated that strike-impact
force increases as a function of the square of impact speed; therefore, higher air speeds will result
in increasingly severe strike events that occur at the altitudes in question.
Risk analysis: The study found no evidence to indicate that safety-risks to aircraft operating
between 3,000 and 10,000 feet will diminish. Furthermore, the study found increasing evidence
that population growths of high-risk species will continue to increase in the short- and middle-term.
Accordingly, the increased safety risks will likely result in increases to the total number of bird
strike events involving high-risk species, the proportion of occurrences at migratory altitudes, the
number of Category-B occurrences, and the potential for a Category-A occurrence.
Mitigation: The study asserted that mitigation should reasonably be expected to reduce exposure,
probability, or severity—or combinations thereof; be intuitive and easy to enact by operational staff
such as pilots and air-traffic controllers; and not place undue financial hardship on aircraft
operators.
Mitigation regarding exposure: As both air-traffic movements and populations of high-risk bird
species are expected to increase in North America for the foreseeable future, the study found that
aircraft exposure to these species is increasing unmitigated.
Mitigation regarding probability: The study observed no new activities that in the short- or middleterm will mitigate the increasing probability of an occurrence between 3,000 and 10,000 feet.
While progress has been made in macro forecasting of large, seasonal movements of high-risk
species, this practice remains an inadequate means of informing aircraft operations. Enhanced
detection methods offer some promise for the future. For example, real-time radar systems are
being developed to detect bird movements in aircraft flight paths; however, this technical capability
is at least a decade away.
Mitigation regarding severity: The study determined that the only appropriate and effective
mitigation currently available is reducing the speed of aircraft operating in high-risk altitudes of
3,000 to 10,000 feet. In light of forecasts predicting increased probability and severity of bird strike
For more information on bird strikes visit
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events below 10,000 feet, the ineffectiveness of other possible mitigation activities, and the
significant relationship of aircraft velocity on impact forces, speed reduction would reduce
exposure, probability and severity of Category-A and, to a slightly lesser degree, Category-B
damage in a bird strike event.
The study also noted other measures to mitigate severity of bird strike events between 3,000 and
10,000 feet; however, these measures are not likely to be proactively implemented. For example, as
discussed earlier, increasing the number of engines on passenger-carrying aircraft would reduce the
probability of Category-A occurrences in the event of multiple strikes to more than one power
plant; however, the risk of such an occurrence remains unmitigated—not only are aircraft and aeroengine designers and manufacturers reducing the number of aircraft engines, but the number of
two-engine aircraft is also projected to increase.
Similarly, changes to airframe- and engine-certification standards fail to mitigate anticipated
increases in the frequency of Category-A and B losses. Current engine models will be
grandfathered under revised FAA engine-certification standards. Meanwhile, no known work is
underway to revise airframe-certification standards, and any such changes would likely take at least
a decade to enact.
Conclusion
The Transport Canada study applied a rigorous data-driven, risk-analysis process to determine that
high-speed departures are not safe, and that NPA 2002–022—which restricts aircraft operations to
speeds of 250 knots or slower below 10,000 feet MSL—is appropriate and effective risk
mitigation.
The study acknowledged that potential operating-cost savings could be achieved with high-speed
flight below 10,000 feet MSL; however, the study also showed that many interrelated operational
constraints would normally impede the realization of these highly theoretical savings. In fact, the
direct damage cost of a single, major Category-B occurrence, or two to three minor Category-B
occurrences, could easily exceed the industry-quoted theoretical annual operational cost savings of
high-speed flight.
Furthermore, the study demonstrated that any organization that would endorse high-speed air
operations below 10,000 feet MSL, which would subject airframes and engines to conditions that
exceed certification standards, faces potential liability.
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